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It has been argued that empirical sci-
ence undermines the claim that people can
deserve punishment, and that the criminal
justice system therefore ought to be radi-
cally reformed. Such arguments lose their
force if moral responsibility and desert do
not depend on what caused the action,
but on the agent’s choice. We solve one
problem for the justification of the crim-
inal justice system, but create another
one; if moral responsibility depends on
the offender’s choice, finding out to what
extent she was responsible might be very
difficult.
Our common practice of holding each
other responsible for our actions contains
elements of character evaluation and prag-
matism, i.e., encouraging some behaviors
and discouraging others. We also have the
idea that people can be morally responsi-
ble for what they do in the sense of deserv-
ing to be praised for exemplary actions
and blamed for bad ones—and even pun-
ished, if the action was bad enough.
Many philosophers and legal theorists who
believe that the primary goal of the crimi-
nal justice system ought to be crime pre-
vention rather than the dealing out of
just deserts, still argue that the offenders’
desert ought to serve as a restriction on
what we are allowed to do in the name of
crime prevention; no one must be given
more punishment than she deserves (e.g.,
von Hirsch, 1992; Lippke, 2014). Since no
system is perfect, it is inevitable that this
principle will sometimes be violated, but
we ought to strive for a system that allows
us to consistently approximate this ideal.
However, if no one were morally respon-
sible for anything, all punishments would
be undeserved, and the criminal justice
system difficult to ethically justify.
Some philosophers and scientists do
argue for the non-existence of moral
responsibility and desert, roughly along
the following lines: Whether an offender
was morally responsible for what she did
depends on how her action was caused. If
it was caused by events beyond her con-
trol, she lacks moral responsibility for it.
Therefore, she does not deserve to be pun-
ished if her crime were caused by, e.g., psy-
chosis, someone slipping a drug into her
drink, or someone making an irresistible
threat toward her. However, all crimes
are ultimately caused by events beyond
the offender’s control (e.g., non-conscious
events in her brain, genes and environ-
ment). Therefore, no one ever deserves to
be punished (Pereboom, 2001; Strawson,
2002; Greene and Cohen, 2004; Harris,
2012). If these philosophers are right, any
system for dealing with criminals resem-
bling the current one might be ethically
unjustifiable.
However, this whole argument fails if
we deny the initial premise that moral
responsibility for an action depends on
how it was caused.
Some philosophers of law and legal the-
orists do deny that premise; Morse (2013)
and Moore (1997) argue that the law
as it stands permits punishing offenders
when they are capable of making choices
for reasons. Furthermore, there is noth-
ing wrong with the law on this point; the
thesis that offenders can deserve punish-
ment for what they have chosen to do
can be defended by philosophical argu-
ment. Many Kantian philosophers argue
that actions can be viewed from two differ-
ent perspectives; a theoretical one, where
we explain why someone did what she
did by pointing at causes, and a practical
one, where we focus on her choice and
her reasons for taking one option rather
than another. The claims we make from
those different perspectives do not contra-
dict each other. I might have chosen to
become a philosopher for the reason that I
found philosophy interesting. If a scientist
were to discover the neurological causa-
tion of interest, it would still be true that
I chose a philosophy career for the reason I
did. Sincemorality is concerned withmak-
ing the right choices for the right reasons,
moral judgments ought to be made from
a practical perspective. Whether someone
was morally responsible for an action and
deserves to be praised, blamed, or pun-
ished depends on the choice she made,
not the underlying causes (Korsgaard,
1996; Bok, 1998; Dworkin, 2011, pp. 224
and 462; Jeppsson, 2012). I call this the-
sis “Practical Perspective Compatibilism,”
or PPC.
According to PPC, many offenders are
morally responsible for what they did, and
would thus deserve to be punished, since
many offenders chose to commit a crime.
PPC can also explain why some psychotic,
drugged or seriously threatened offend-
ers ought to be excused: in these states,
they might very well be bereft of choice.
Alternatively, in the case of a serious threat,
the offender might have consciously cho-
sen to do the least bad thing in a terrible
situation; even if she were morally respon-
sible for this choice we might judge that
she did nothing wrong if she, e.g., stole
an object because someone threatened to
kill her children otherwise, and therefore
she ought to go unpunished. It is evident
that these excuses do not generalize to all
offenders. It is still the case that many
offenders choose to commit crimes, and
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no advancements made in neurobiology
or other empirical sciences will undermine
this claim. Their choices may have had
causes, but they were still choices. PPC
thus solves one problem for the ethical
justification of criminal justice, but it cre-
ates another one; if moral responsibility
depends on the offender’s choice, finding
out to what extent she was responsible
might be very difficult.
Drawing the line between agents who
deserve some kind of punishment for
committing a crime and those who ought
to be completely excused might not be
too difficult in most cases (Moore, 1997,
p. 112; Kenny, 2010, pp. 392–401). But
if moral responsibility and desert depend
on the offender choosing actions, cases
where the offender deserves less punish-
ment due to having diminished respon-
sibility for her crime will be difficult to
judge1. If moral responsibility depends
on the offender’s choice, mitigating cir-
cumstances mitigate only insofar as they
affect said choice.When the offendermade
less of a choice, she was less responsible
(Jeppsson, 2012, pp. 58–67; Coates and
Swenson, 2013). This claim is intuitively
plausible. When choosing what to do, we
try to find an option that we have most
or at least sufficient reason to pursue,
according to our own views about reasons
(Jeppsson, 2012, pp. 59–60; see also Wolf,
1990, p. 31; implicit in Kapitan, 1986;
Pereboom, 2008). (This assumption is not
supposed to be controversial, since “our
own views about reasons” may encompass
a wide range of views.) We often consider
only a few options, or immediately choose
what to do without considering alterna-
tive actions at all, because it is immedi-
ately obvious to us that this option is at
least good enough. But occasionally agents
fail to consider options that were actu-
ally superior, according to the agents’ own
views about reasons, to the option they
picked, merely because these other options
somehow did not strike them as real alter-
natives. They fail to fully choose what
to do. If moral responsibility depends on
choice, someone who did not fully choose
is plausibly less than fully responsible.
The PPC theory of diminished respon-
sibility thus has the resources to explain,
1Even if we set aside the acknowledged problem of
matching up appropriate punishments with crimes
(Duff, 1986, p. 280; von Hirsch, 1992).
not only why some psychotic, drugged
or seriously threatened offenders ought to
be completely excused, but also the fairly
common judgment that a harsh environ-
ment can constitute mitigating circum-
stances (e.g., Hudson, 1995, 1999). We
might think that a young criminal from
a run-down, high-crime neighborhood is
less responsible for her crimes, and there-
fore less deserving of punishment, than
a young criminal who had everything
going for her and yet chose to commit
crimes. The criminal from the bad neigh-
borhood might have been expected to turn
to crime; she internalized these expecta-
tions, and failed to really see honesty as
an alternative, even though an honest life
might have seemed preferable to her had
she really thought about it. She did not
fully choose to become a criminal (whereas
her more well-to-do counterpart made an
active decision to engage in crime), and
therefore her responsibility is diminished.
These explanations of why a harsh envi-
ronment is mitigating are intuitively more
plausible than anything a causality-based
theory of moral responsibility can pro-
vide, since it does not generally seem to
be the case that causal influences behind
one’s choice renders one less respon-
sible (I am presumably fully responsi-
ble for becoming a philosopher, despite
the fact that this decision was undoubt-
edly influenced by a number of external
factors).
However, we know that similar circum-
stances do not affect everyone equally. It
is possible that a young criminal from a
run-down and high-crime neighborhood
did think things through and made an
informed decision to become a crimi-
nal rather than engage in honest work.
It is thus possible that out of two young
criminals with a similar background, com-
mitting their crimes in similar circum-
stances, one is fully morally responsible
for what she did and therefore deserves a
harsh punishment, whereas the other one
has diminished moral responsibility and
deserves leniency. The same thing can be
said about any circumstance that is nor-
mally considered mitigating; whether it
diminishes the responsibility of this par-
ticular offender or not, depends on how it
affected her choice. It seems difficult, to say
the least, to ascertain how much punish-
ment offenders deserve in particular cases,
if moral responsibility and desert depend
on their choices.
We might try to ensure that we do
not give some offenders more punish-
ment than they deserve by adopting a
generally lenient approach when sentenc-
ing (Duus-Otterström, 2013). Possibly, in
order to be on the safe side, we would
have to be very lenient, to an extent
that seriously conflicts with the goal of
crime prevention. However, there is some
empirical support for the thesis that if
people are led to believe that they were
not really responsible for what they did,
this belief makes them follow temptation
rather than making active choices (Vohs
and Schooler, 2008), i.e., people’s belief
that they lack moral responsibility might
actually erode their moral responsibility.
Even if we were willing to accept that
there are offenders who are chronically bad
at making choices and keep performing
actions that they do not really believe that
they have reason to do, and who there-
fore never come to deserve more than
fairly mild punishment despite repeated
crimes, a system that actually pushed peo-
ple in that direction would certainly be a
failed one.
Thus, PPC ensures that offenders can
bemorally responsible for their crimes and
therefore deserve punishment, regardless
of what neurobiology and other empir-
ical sciences might find. But PPC also
implies that finding out to what extent
someone was responsible for what she
did might be very difficult, perhaps even
impossible.
CONCLUSION
If moral responsibility depends on the
agent’s choice rather than on her action
being caused in the right way, we need
not worry that findings in neurobiology
or other empirical sciences will under-
mine the claim that people can be morally
responsible for what they do. This might
seem like good news for the criminal jus-
tice system, insofar as it depends on the
assumption that offenders can deserve to
be punished for its ethical justification.
However, if an offender’s level of moral
responsibility ultimately depends on how
she chose to do what she did, finding out
to what extent she was morally responsible
for her crime, and thus how much punish-
ment she deserves, might be difficult. If we
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ought not to punish anyone harder than
she deserves, this is a problem that must
be addressed.
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